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NONECONOMIC DAMAGES, SUFFERING, AND THE
ROLE OF THE PLAINTIFF'S LAWYER
Ellen S. Pryor*
Tort law has many terms for suffering, including general damages,
noneconomic damages, pain and suffering, mental anguish, impair-
ment, loss of the enjoyment of life, and loss of companionship and
society. All these terms signify forms of human suffering: from pain;
from injury and shock; from loss of ability, mobility, or livelihood;
from the loss of a loved one; from the recognition that life will never
be the same. Each year the vast tort engine processes tens of
thousands of claims for suffering. The players in the tort system-the
plaintiff's lawyer, the defense lawyer, and the insurance company and
its adjusters-articulate, investigate, measure, probe, argue, gather ev-
idence, strategize, monetize, and bargain over these claims for
suffering.
How does this legal claiming process affect the suffering of the
plaintiff?1 That some effects occur is difficult to dispute. Whatever
the nature of the injury and whoever the plaintiff is, suffering is an
experience with permeable boundaries, shaped not just by the medical
nature of the injury but also by psychological, spiritual, relational, and
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1. One might argue that this question-however fundamental it might seem-is far down in
the queue of questions meriting empirical research or systematic study. First, we plausibly could
sense that, even if the tort process alters or misshapes the suffering of the individual, this is an
inevitable result of a compensation-claiming system of any kind. Thus, even if we were to find
that although we regret what we intuitively sense as some suffering inflicted or aggravated by
tort, we sense that, in the main, it cannot be avoided.
Second, we could suspect that this fundamental question cannot be studied in ways that would
produce insights that could be useful to the system. For instance, we might undertake longitudi-
nal research-at a time right after case resolution and again five years later-that would assess
the qualitative experience of suffering and the factors that affected it. Even aside from the
daunting task of designing such studies, it could yield few generalizable insights. These and
other considerations do seem to be powerful reasons for a paucity of information about how the
tort process affects the suffering of the plaintiff.
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other factors. Whether the plaintiff files a claim that is settled quickly
or one that takes years to litigate, the legal claim process will be an
overlay onto and will affect how the plaintiff experiences and makes
meaning of his or her suffering. The legal process does not just evalu-
ate, measure, and eventually compensate (or not compensate) for
"noneconomic damages" that stand independent of the legal process.
No, the legal process itself inevitably will be an influence on the plain-
tiff's "noneconomic" losses.2
This Article addresses one topic within this larger subject: the link
between the plaintiff's lawyer's representation of the plaintiff and the
plaintiff's experience of suffering. Simply looking at the lawyer's role
might suggest that there is little to say about the connection of the
2. What does tort scholarship and medical-rehabilitative research tell us about the interaction
between tort and the plaintiff's experience of suffering? Certainly the tort liability debates have
produced extensive scholarship on noneconomic losses, including horizontal and vertical equity,
effects of capping noneconomic damages, and the economic efficiency of noneconomic damage
from an insurance perspective. See Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort:
Scheduling "Pain and Suffering," 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 908, 919-24 (1989) (discussing lack of hori-
zontal equity); Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-
and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1787 (1995) (discussing debate over the
inefficiency of noneconomic damages); George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Mod-
em Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1556-57 (1987) (same); Ellen Smith Pryor, The Tort Law
Debate, Efficiency, and the Kingdom of the Ill: A Critique of the Insurance Theory of Compensa-
tion, 79 VA. L. REV. 91, 99-100 (1993) (same); Michael J. Saks, Comments on the Vidmar and
Diamond Studies, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 423 (1998) (same). Much of this research, of course, has
focused on different questions than tort law's effect on the noneconomic loss of the plaintiff.
Some lines of research have focused more directly on how the tort process affects the individ-
ual plaintiff. Procedural justice research asks about the factors that affect whether and when the
tort process can leave a sense that justice has been served. See E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of
the Beholder: Tort Litigants' Evaluations of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAW
& Soc'Y REV. 953 (1990) (showing value to participants of processes that give them a sense of
respect and dignity). Some tort-related research appears in the body of therapeutic jurispru-
dence, a significant body of work that examines legal doctrines and systems with an eye toward
improving their power to improve the lives and mental health of individuals. See generally LAW
IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (David B. Wexler &
Bruce J. Winick eds., 1996); PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING
PROFESSION (Dennis P. Stolle et al. eds., 2000); Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Compen-
sation in Tort Law, 43 KAN. L. REV. 39, 62-65 (1994) (analyzing procedural justice research in
the setting of tort compensation).
Perhaps the most directly relevant body of work is the long-standing and extensive
literature inquiring into whether the tort system prolongs the process of recovery from injury.
This literature springs from both medical and legal sources. Medical rehabilitation literature has
extensively debated: whether the pendency of a claim (for tort or workers' compensation) delays
or reduces recovery; to what extent the amount or timing of compensation payments can create
incentives not to energetically rehabilitate and return to work; and whether filing or litigating a
claim creates some sort of disability mentality (conscious or subconscious) that impedes recov-
ery. See generally EDWARD B. BLANCHARD & EDWARD J. HICKLING, AFTER THE CRASH: As-
SESSMENT AND TREATMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT SURVIVORS (1997) (canvassing the
studies on the relationship between compensation claiming and rehabilitation outcomes). The
precise questions asked by various studies, and the methodology used, vary considerably.
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lawyer's representation to the client's suffering. The lawyer's role is to
represent the individual in his or her legal claim; the lawyer is not, and
should not, function as a grief counselor or therapist. Thus, the law-
yer's representation is concerned with the client's suffering (among
other matters), but in fact probably has little effect, and should not
affect, the client's suffering.
This Article contends that a linkage between the lawyer's role and
the client's suffering does exist. From the start of the case-which can
be as early as days after the injury event-to its end, the lawyer is
professionally charged with the task of articulating the client's injury
in all the ways that the case requires: investigating, engaging in discov-
ery, measuring, strategizing, negotiating, and monetizing the injury.
And this process cannot take place in a way that is entirely bracketed
off from the experience of suffering itself. Whatever the nature of the
injury or whoever the plaintiff is, suffering will be a process-an open
system and not a closed one. The legal claiming process will clearly be
an overlay on an already-in-motion psychological, spiritual, and mean-
ing-making process. The strength and shape of the lawyer's influence,
and the nature of the legal-psychological-spiritual lawyering, may be
debatable, changing, and partly unknowable. But the lawyer will
surely have some effect on a psychological, spiritual, and meaning-
making process.
Given that the lawyer's representation is linked to the suffering pro-
cess, the next question is if, and how, a lawyer's representation can
have a positive role, or at least avoid negative impacts to the degree
possible, as to the plaintiff's suffering process. This Article addresses
that question. Part II starts outside the legal process, looking at in-
sights and practices relating to how a helpful third person can be avail-
able to and engaged with a suffering individual. The point here is not
to suggest that a lawyer must follow these insights and replicate these
practices. Rather, the hiim is to gain knowledge about how the pres-
ence and engagement of other people can ameliorate or intensify
suffering.
With these insights in mind, Part III turns to the role of the lawyer.
It first identifies the key ways in which the personal injury lawyer's
representation will intersect with, and possibly influence, the client's
suffering and loss process. Having identified these points of connec-
tion, the discussion, in subpart B, moves to the critical question of
competence: is a lawyer competent to identify and to act in ways that
are helpful, or at least not harmful, to the client's loss process? Be-
cause the answer to this question is affirmative in at least some re-
2006]
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spects, subpart C sets out some thoughts and guidelines about the
plaintiff's lawyer's actions and counsel. 3
Throughout, the goal is not to argue that lawyers, when possible,
must represent clients in ways that facilitate or at least not interfere
with the client's healing. Rather, this Article is an effort to answer a
question that I have heard students and practicing lawyers raise.
These lawyers and students are attracted to personal injury practice in
part because they want to help individuals in times of crisis and pain.
Yet they wonder: Am I crossing boundaries? Can I be a good per-
sonal injury lawyer-a good advocate for my clients-and not inter-
fere with their healing and recovery? Their question is not about what
they must do under the rules of professional responsibility. Rather,
they wonder if and how their role as advocate may also include facili-
tating the healing process for their clients.
II. SUFFERING AND THE PRESENCE OF ANOTHER
A. Suffering
Suffering, and the efforts to ameliorate or console, come in innu-
merable faces and forms. Job's friends, having heard of his afflictions,
"made an appointment together to come to mourn with him, and to
comfort him .... [When they saw him,] they lifted up their voice, and
wept ... [and] sat down with him upon the ground seven days and
seven nights, and none spake a word unto him: for they saw that his
grief was very great."' 4 (Later, of course, the friends would be much
less helpful, trying to find explanations for Job's sufferings.) In King
Lear, Edgar encounters his father, the blind, despairing Earl of
Gloucester, who asks Edgar (whom he does not recognize) to lead
him to the cliffs of Dover so that he can jump. With a loving and
clever deception, Edgar tricks Gloucester into thinking that he has
jumped from the cliff but that the gods have preserved him: "Ten
masts at each make not the altitude / Which thou hast perpendicularly
fell: / Thy life's a miracle."' 5 In our world, friends grieve with and com-
fort friends, and helping professionals of all sorts employ their training
and skills to relieve suffering: doctors, nurses, hospice workers, pas-
3. Cf. Carolyn Copps Hartley & Carrie J. Petrucci, Practicing Culturally Competent Therapeu-
tic Jurisprudence: A Collaboration Between Social Work and Law, 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y
133, 140-41 (2004) (suggesting that while lawyers should not become therapists, lawyers should
"become familiar with the psychological dimensions of behavior in a manner similar to that of a
generalist social worker").
4. Job 2:11-13 (King James).
5. WILLIAM SHAKEPEARE, KING LEAR act 4, sc. 6, verses 53-55.
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toral counselors, psychologists, psychiatrists, ministers, doctors, sui-
cide hotline workers, social workers, and grief counselors.
It would be impossible and brazen to try to identify, describe, and
explore the many forms and faces of suffering, and the many styles of
healing, comforting, and amelioration. A more limited inquiry, how-
ever, can take us far enough to allow meaningful discussion of the
lawyer's role, to be discussed in Part III. For now, then, the aim is to
build an understanding of suffering, and of the work of comfort and
amelioration, rich enough to lead us to that point.
When approaching the definitions and shapes of suffering-includ-
ing the medical, psychological, spiritual, and culture literature-this
Article does not need to work from a particular definition or theory of
suffering.6 Rather, we will concentrate on the salient themes that ap-
pear in this literature, insofar as they relate to the types of losses in-
cluded under the rubric of noneconomic damages.
Most obviously, suffering can arise from and be connected to physi-
cal pain. 7 In this sense, to relieve the physical pain is to relieve the
suffering. This very basic aspect of suffering is contained in tort's rec-
ognition of damages for "pain and suffering." But suffering, of
course, does not simply arise from, and thus is not bounded by, the
extent of physical pain. Suffering also appears in the form of grief.
Most generally, grief refers to the "emotional pain that accompanies a
sense of loss.' '8 "Bereavement," in turn, generally refers to the re-
sponses and actions that a person undertakes in response to his or her
grief.9 Although much of the grief and bereavement literature focuses
on situations involving the death of a loved one, the terms can be used
with respect to any sense of loss. Grief captures a wide and long tra-
jectory: it has "come to mean the complex, intense internal responses
to all perceived and felt losses.... Along with deep emotion there will
6. Needless to say, defining or setting conceptual boundaries on suffering has been challeng-
ing for all those who have seriously examined it. The Christian ethicist Stanley Hauerwas dis-
cussed the difficulty of finding the conceptual boundaries of suffering: "Our assumption that
suffering is a universal phenomenon makes us forget that we can only talk intelligently about it
through the use of paradigm instances. In other words, the meaning of suffering varies from one
interpretive context to another." STANLEY HAUERWAS, SUFFERING PRESENCE: THEOLOGICAL
REFLECTIONS ON MEDICINE, THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED, AND THE CHURCH 29-30 (1986).
Near the beginning of his book on suffering, Dr. Eric J. Cassell discussed the difficulty of finding
medical literature that helped illuminate the meaning of suffering as distinct from pain. ERIC J.
CASSELL, THE NATURE OF SUFFERING: AND THE GOALS MEDICINE 32 (1991).
7. CASSELL, supra note 6, at 31-33.
8. RICHARD A. DERSHIMER, COUNSELING THE BEREAVED 15 (1990) (internal citations
omitted).
9. Id. at 16 (noting different variations, some of which limit the term to instances of death).
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be spiritual, psychological, and physical turmoil as well."' 10 Again,
noneconomic damages include these dimensions of grief, whether in
the terms mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, or loss of compan-
ionship and society.
Even though the notion of grief captures a vast set of experiences,
reactions, and dimensions, it tends to sound retrospective-as in grief
for a loss that has already occurred. The experience of grief is ongo-
ing, but the term seems to reference a loss that has occurred: the loved
one died, the spinal cord was severed, the limb was amputated. In this
sense, the term "grief" can fail to capture another dimension of suffer-
ing-the experience of an injury or threat that, day to day, can change
in intensity, implications, and nature. So, for instance, when we say
that we grieve for the loved one who has died or for the leg we have
lost, we signify a process that is still occurring, but we refer to an in-
jury or event that can be located at some prior period of time.
People also suffer, of course, from an injury or threat that is ongo-
ing and chronic. For instance, someone is in a wheelchair because his
lumbar spinal cord was damaged; another was exposed to a toxic
chemical that caused cancer (and thus a course of treatment) and that
continues to cause seizures, strange allergies, and infections. Here,
the injury event seems less historical. So the term grief-to the extent
it seems to represent the pain and adjustment that still goes on about
an event in the past-might not capture the suffering associated with
the experience of an ongoing injury or illness. Yet grief, in the sense
of mental pain caused by the experience of loss, surely exists in cases
of chronic and ongoing injury or disease.11 And the ongoing injury or
disease causes the suffering of physical pain and discomfort, along
with additional suffering of assimilating the new level of injury and
beginning another thread in the web of adjustment.
Suffering also includes what some have called the "secondary
losses" associated with an initial injury or trauma. This is a "physical
or psychosocial loss that coincides with or develops as a consequence
of the initial loss."' 12 This might include financial difficulties, divorce,
and the like. As one commentator noted: "In some cases, it is unclear
when the end of the chain of associated losses is reached-in fact it
10. Id.
11. The point here is not to draw some bright boundary between ongoing grief for a loss event
that has occurred and an injury or disease process that is chronic or ongoing. Rather, the aim is
just to highlight that suffering includes not just the mental pain of grieving for the loss, but also
the mental pain of enduring and adjusting to losses chronic in nature. Tort law recognizes this
aspect of suffering, too.
12. JOHN H. HARVEY, GIVE SORROW WORDS: PERSPECTIVES ON LOSS AND TRAUMA 4 (2000).
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may not be reached until the survivor also dies."'1 3 To some extent,
tort law allows compensation for these losses.
In addition, although we can generally say that certain events will
cause suffering-intense physical pain, the loss of a loved one, the loss
of a livelihood-the nature and shape of suffering is always unique to
a given individual. It is said: "Suffering is ultimately a personal mat-
ter-something whose presence and extent can be known only to the
sufferer.' 14
To say that suffering is eventually a personal matter unique to the
sufferer has several other implications. First, because the person him-
self or herself-before the time of the injury event-has been formed
by familial, cultural, economic, religious, and other factors, these fac-
tors themselves will influence the experience of suffering. Second, af-
ter the injury event, the person continues to live and experience the
suffering within a particular set of cultural, economic, religious, and
familial circumstances and influences. These circumstances might
themselves be altered drastically by the injury (such as devastating
economic effects or abandonment of a belief in God). Thus, the expe-
rience of suffering includes a kind of cycling process: the person's suf-
fering is influenced by cultural, familial, and other factors; these in
turn can be affected by and thus altered by the injury; and these al-
tered dynamics influence the suffering process. Dr. Eric Cassell has
said that suffering can affect "[a]ll the aspects of personhood-the
lived past, the family's lived past, culture and society, roles, the instru-
mental dimension, associations and relationships, the body, the uncon-
scious mind, the political being, the secret life, the perceived future,
and the transcendent-being dimension .... 15
In sum, given the variety of lenses through which suffering can be
examined, several themes seem consistent through the literature (al-
though the language of these themes can differ by discipline). First,
pain can be a source of suffering, but suffering extends beyond physi-
cal pain and beyond the demarcated boundaries of a given injury.
Second, suffering includes grief, which is the mental and internal pain
that accompanies the experience of serious loss. Suffering is also a
part of the process of bereavement, the term often used to express the
actions and responses that the person takes in response to grief.
Third, suffering is connected not just to grief and bereavement over
losses that have occurred in the past; suffering also includes the
mental pain and evolving sense of loss that goes along with a loss that
13. Id. (internal citations omitted).
14. See CASSELL, supra note 6, at 35.
15. Id. at 43.
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is less defined historically and that is, instead, more chronic in nature.
Fourth, suffering can also be the result of what we can call secondary
losses-problems and losses that result from the "main" loss, such as
financial dislocation, divorce, relocation. Fifth, although we can confi-
dently generalize that certain types of losses produce suffering or even
intense suffering, in the end suffering is unique to the individual, con-
sidering his or her history, psychological and physical makeup, eco-
nomic and family circumstances, and spiritual compass.
These variables affect his or her suffering, and in turn his or her
suffering affects these variables, and these individual movements once
again cycle back into the experience of suffering-as in the case of a
person whose loss is initially framed through the lens of faith, whose
loss eventually shatters that faith, and whose eventual suffering in-
cludes the mental pain of feeling abandoned by the God in which he
or she once believed.
B. Suffering and the Presence of the Other
Ours is a society familiar with many terms and tools directed at the
amelioration of suffering: rehabilitation, pain control clinics, biofeed-
back, grief work, recovery, healing, empowerment, spiritual direction,
rebuilding, trauma and crisis intervention, and cognitive and other
forms of therapy. Here, we need not explore all these models and
tools. Instead, the more modest aim is to draw from this literature
some of the most salient insights about how environments, institu-
tions, and other people can facilitate or interrupt a process of healing
and recovery. To reach these insights, we must gain some general un-
derstanding of the processes by which suffering ever diminishes, and
recovery from loss ever occurs.
We should start by recognizing two related yet distinct bodies of
knowledge relevant to loss. One is rehabilitation: the tools and meth-
ods by which the injured person obtains, to the extent possible, his or
her full functional, educational, vocational, and psychological capacity
after the injury.16 This broad definition includes the medical measures
that will correct and improve the underlying impairment such as the
16. See ENABLING AMERICA: ASSESSING THE ROLE OF REHABILITATION SCIENCE AND ENGI-
NEERING 24 (Edward N. Brandt, Jr. & Andrew M. Pope eds., 1997) (noting that rehabilitation
refers to the "lifelong process of obtaining 'optimal function despite residual disability"') (quot-
ing DeLisa et al., infra); Joel A. DeLisa et al., Rehabilitation Medicine: Past, Present, and Future,
in REHABILITATION MEDICINE: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 3 (Joel A. DeLisa et al. eds., 3d ed.
1998) (defining rehabilitation as the process of helping the person achieve the fullest functional,
vocational, educational, and psychological potential that is consistent with the person's disability
and life plans). For discussion of how rehabilitation, as a goal, does and should connect with tort
law, see Ellen S. Pryor, Rehabilitating Tort Compensation, 91 GEO. L.J. 659 (2003).
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Harrington rod surgery that will stabilize the spine, or the skin graft-
ing after a burn. It also includes all the techniques and tools available
for improving the person's functional capacity once the medical im-
pairment has been addressed to the extent possible. Included, then,
are vocational rehabilitation, speech therapy, physical therapy, recrea-
tional therapy, prosthetic devices, assistive technology, pain control
techniques such as biofeedback, and environmental and workplace
accommodations.
The other broad body of knowledge relates to recovery, grief, and
bereavement. The languages and tools of recovery and grief are not
an alternative to, or in contradiction with, the vast body of knowledge
on rehabilitation. Rather, these broad categories focus on different
dimensions of a loss. Both are aimed at reducing suffering and resto-
ration of the person's functionality and well-being. Indeed, we could
use the word "recovery" to describe both bodies of knowledge. The
rehabilitation world, though, is focused on reducing the disabling con-
sequences of an injury: improving mobility, work capacity, speech
ability, cognitive functioning, pain control, and other consequences.
The grief and recovery world is focused on how the person-as dimin-
ished by the loss during or after any rehabilitation that is possible-
endures, and makes recovery steps in response to the sorrow, grief,
and dislocation created by the loss.
Both of these worlds are relevant to this Article's theme, because
each focuses on a dimension of the client's losses. For the rest of Part
II, we will concentrate on the insights and tools of the recovery litera-
ture. Part III will then incorporate these points while considering the
lawyer's role.
1. The Postloss Experience
Loss sets in motion a process of grief, coping, and meaning making.
This notion appears in all models for understanding a postloss experi-
ence: psychological, philosophical, cultural, and spiritual. 17 For our
purposes, we need not discuss the details of the grief and bereavement
models that have been the subject of application and study, such as
various "phases of grief" models.18 Rather, several key insights com-
mon to most of the literature are important to mention here.
First, the reaction to and grief over a loss entails a process, or a
series of movements, in which the individual copes with, adjusts to,
and makes meaning of the loss. These movements can include the
17. DERSHIMER, supra note 8, at 18.
18. For discussion of models that include phases of grief, see id. at 18-24.
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following:19 recognizing, in a cognitive fashion, that the loss has oc-
curred;20 reacting to the loss in a way that allows full experience of the
pain of the loss and expression of the range of emotions from the
loss;21 relinquishing assumptions about the world that no longer work
in light of the loss;22 readjusting or relearning the world in a way that
tries to find meaning in a life without what was lost.23
Second, no model of the stages or process of grief can be predictive
of any single individual. The ideas of stages of grieving "take root in
empirical studies of large populations of grieving people. They are at
best statistical generalizations describing what is probable across a
particular population. But statements of probability say nothing spe-
cific about particular individuals. 12 4
Third, recognizing grief as a process with movements does not re-
quire or presuppose a particular psychological, spiritual, or cultural
understanding of loss. Put another way, whoever the person is, and
whatever institutional and helping context surrounds the person, the
postloss experience will involve movement, steps, a process. How the
person moves through this process will depend in many ways on the
19. GERALDINE M. HUMPHREY & DAVID G. ZIMPFER, COUNSELLING FOR GRIEF AND BE-
REAVEMENT 7-8 (1996) (discussing the evolution of different approaches to the "stages" of
grief). Although many models of grief stages were developed specifically with respect to grief
after death, the models have been applied to other kinds of losses. Id. at 8. This theme-the
postloss experience involving these movements-appears in the literature as both a descriptive
and prescriptive one. After a loss, every person makes some movements of the sorts described
above. Prescriptively, most grief and recovery wisdom views this movement as necessary and
desirable, while recognizing that not all persons go through these or go through them in the same
way.
20. Id. at 7; see also THOMAS ArIG, How WE GRIEVE: RELEARNING THE WORLD 45 (1996);
DERSHIMER, supra note 8, at 20.
21. HUMPHREY & ZIMPFER, supra note 19, at 7; see also ATrIO, supra note 20, at 47-48 (dis-
cussing the need to acknowledge the loss, explaining that this requires a struggle to take in the
reality and make sense of the loss, and acknowledging our feelings and express or otherwise
process them); DERSHIMER, supra note 8, at 20-22 (describing these reactions and emotions as
included in a phase he calls "acute grief").
22. HUMPHREY & ZIMPFER, supra note 19, at 8; see also LAWRENCE G. CALHOUN & RICHARD
G. TEDESCHI, FACILITATING POSTT'RAUMATIC GROWTH 17-19 (1999).
23. HUMPHREY & ZIMPFER, supra note 19, at 8; see also ATriG, supra note 20, at 49-50 (ex-
plaining that grief following death involves a process of relearning the world, including our phys-
ical world, the social world, our selves, and our spiritual beliefs); Robert A. Neimeyer, The
Language of Loss: Grief Therapy as a Process of Meaning Reconstruction, in MEANING RECON-
STRUCrION & THE EXPERIENCE OF Loss 261, 289 (Robert A. Neimeyer ed., 2001) (emphasizing
the need for a model of grief that seeks not to "normalize" grief but to recognize the need for
and individuality of meaningmaking after the loss).
24. A-riG, supra note 20, at 45. See also Camille B. Wortman & Roxane Cohen Silver, The
Myths of Coping With Loss, 57 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 349 (1989) (discussing and
questioning several general assumptions about stages of grief).
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person's psychological and spiritual framework,25 his or her familial
system, 26 and other factors. 27 But the person's experience will be a
process of movement, flux, and, sometimes, of reaching new stages.
For instance, for a Christian who believes in an all-loving and all-pow-
erful God, recognizing and fully expressing the loss may involve rec-
ognizing the sense of betrayal or abandonment by God, and
adaptation may involve a reconfigured sense of who God is in his or
her life and in the world.28 Thus, the notion of movements is useful no
matter what system of meaning the person had.
2. People Engage in a Process of Meaning Making
During various steps of the postloss process, people continuously
engage (more or less consciously, with or without professional coun-
seling, and with or without a religious framework) in what many call
"meaning making"-an effort to understand and make sense of "the
meaning of a loss and its significance for their changed lives. ' '29 This is
not simply a cognitive task of learning new information (such as medi-
cal information); it is likewise not only a task of encountering new
attitudes from others, or changed work habits and social relations, or
financial situations. 30 Rather, it is these things and more: the process
of relearning the world, making sense of the world, making meaning
of the world after the loss. 31
25. See ArriG, supra note 20, at 120 (discussing changes in self and spiritual understandings);
CALHOUN & TEDESCHI, supra note 22, at 10-17 (discussing how posttraumatic growth can in-
volve changed sense of one's self, of relationships with others, and of God or ultimate meaning).
26. See ATriO, supra note 20, at 152-56 (discussing the connections between grieving and the
person's familial and social structure).
27. Id. at 155 (explaining that how one copes with loss can be affected by "differences in
gender, age, economic class, ethnic origin, and culture"); CASSELL, supra note 6, at 37-43 (stat-
ing that illness, suffering, and loss can affect all the aspects of personhood: "the lived past, the
family's lived past, culture and society, roles, the instrumental dimension, associations and rela-
tionships, the body, the unconscious mind, the political being, the secret life, the perceived fu-
ture, and the transcendent-being dimension").
28. See Aio, supra note 20, at 119-21 (describing sense of abandonment or betrayal by God
and movement toward a changed spiritual understanding).
29. Neimeyer, supra note 23, at 263.
30. Cf. AT-rG, supra note 20, at 14 (discussing this concept in the context of recovery from
death of a loved one).
31. The literature contains different terms for this process. See id. at 12 (explaining and elabo-
rating on the notion of "relearning" the world in the context of bereavement after death); CAL-
HOUN & TEDESCHI, supra note 22, at 17 (explaining how traumatic events shake the person's
worldview and initiate the process of ruminating about what happened and how the person will
now fit this into his or her worldview); HARVEY, supra note 12, at 6, 26-31 (discussing the theme
of "account-making" or storytelling as people construct meaning after loss); HUMPHREY &
ZIMPFER, supra note 19, at 1 (explaining that the loss "includes ideas of reaction, adaptation, and
process .... The bereaved person reacts emotionally as the pain of grief is experienced, and
gradually reacts cognitively and behaviourally as a new identity is formed and a life is rebuilt").
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This notion of "meaning making" is meant to be broad. This gener-
ality allows room for the considerable variation that can exist among
individuals and loss experiences. 32 Losses are different, both objec-
tively (as seen or measured by some external referent), individually,
and culturally. The death of a loved one, the onset of mesothelioma,
an injury that leads to paraplegia, a back injury resulting in chronic
pain-all these and innumerable other major losses will trigger a
meaning-making process, but the shape, difficulty, and pain of that
process will vary according to the nature of the injury, and individual
and cultural factors.33 This meaning-making work includes struggling
for answers to questions: What happened? Why did it happen? What
will happen now? What is to become of my life now? 34
The work of meaning making often takes the form of and employs
narrative-the process by which the person interprets, self-communi-
cates, and communicates with others about what happened, why it
happened, what it means, and what will happen. The theme of narra-
tive is huge in the literature of suffering because all suffering takes
place within an interpretive context. 35 This is not to say that suffering
is all "in the mind," but that suffering inevitably includes some inter-
pretation. At a minimum, the person perceives that he or she is suf-
fering "from" something, and this requires at least an implicit notion
of what this is.36
32. The text includes, in the concept of loss and the theme of relearning, both the death of a
loved one and other major losses. This general treatment requires some explanation. The litera-
ture on suffering and bereavement does not always address the subject of loss by death and
other losses together. Rather, a considerable amount of writing and research focuses specifically
on the suffering and grief that follows the death of a loved one. Nonetheless, in this and other
parts of the paper, loss will be used to include death and major losses other than death. This is
consistent with the literature. See HARVEY, supra note 12, at 18-19 (explaining the definition of
a "major loss); Neimeyer, supra note 23, at 263 (discussing the need to reconstruct one's life
narrative in the wake of significant loss).
33. This broad notion of meaning making is also meant to be descriptive, not normative. The
point is not that individuals should engage in a process by which they reconsider their world and
emerge with new meanings. Granted, we desire that this process occur in a way that is healing
and restorative, and so the notion of meaning making is a normative goal. But for now, the point
is not the desirability of this process or how to facilitate healing and recovery. Rather, the point
is just descriptive: loss will provoke a process of relearning, of meaning making, to some degree
and in some shape.
34. ARTHUR KLEINMAN, THE ILLNESS NARRATIVES 29 (1988) (referring to the second two
questions and calling them, respectively, the question of bafflement and the question of order
and control).
35. See HARVEY, supra note 12, at 7-8 (explaining that people often conceive their losses in
terms of "accounts or stories that contextualize the major events of their lives"); HAUERWAS,
supra note 6, at 28 ("Our ability to recognize our suffering means that suffering always takes
place in an interpretive context.").
36. See HAUERWAS, supra note 6, at 28.
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Applying this notion to chronic illness, the doctor and medical an-
thropologist Arthur Kleinman has explained:
[P]atients order their experience of illness-what it means to them
and to significant others-as personal narratives. The illness narra-
tive is a story the patient tells, and significant others retell, to give
coherence to the distinctive events and long-term course of suffer-
ing. The plot lines, core metaphors, and rhetorical devices that
structure the illness narratives are drawn from cultural and personal
models for arranging experiences in meaningful ways and for effec-
tively communicating those meanings. 37
Applying the idea of narrative to bereavement of loss, others have
pointed to the "value of stories, storytelling, and story-listening in
dealing with loss and as essential elements of effective grieving. ' 38
Narrative fits into the process of meaning making in multiple ways.
The narrative impulse is a means by which the person tries to order,
manage, and find some meaning in the shattering, dislocating loss. 39
3. The Sense of Control and Predictability, Ruptured Assumptions,
Attributions of Responsibility, and Justice
According to the experiences of those who suffer loss and third per-
sons who help the suffering individual, a number of issues affect the
process by which people engage in meaning making and move
through various points after a loss. One is the blow to, or shattering
of, one's assumptions about the world. A loss can rupture one's world
view-the "set of beliefs people have about how the universe func-
tions and what place they, as individuals, occupy therein. ' 40 This
world view includes not just cognitive thoughts and assumptions, but
"a web of perceptions, feelings, images, and values that each person
spins from specific personal experiences."' 41 In the face of a major
loss, many pieces of this world view collapse and no longer make
sense. Sometimes, the loss shatters the most central pieces of the per-
son's world view: a sense that life has meaning and purpose; a sense
that he or she is worth loving; a belief in God.42
37. KLEINMAN, supra note 34, at 49.
38. HARVEY, supra note 12, at 27.
39. Id. at 28-29 (discussing the view that the work of constructing an account with a pattern
and plot can help give the person a greater sense of control and bring a sense of manageability to
the chaos of the loss).
40. DERSHIMER, supra note 8, at 38.
41. Id. at 39.
42. See id. at 47-62 (discussing the role of spirituality, including shaken faith views, in griev-
ing); HARVEY, supra note 12, at 24 (explaining that major loss often shatters assumptions "that
the world is a benign place, it is a meaningful place, and that we are worthy people").
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Another theme in the process of meaning making is dealing with
the subject of responsibility. Arthur Kleinman has pointed out one of
the fundamental questions that suffering presents, for both the sick
person and the social group, is "why me?"-what he calls the "ques-
tion of bafflement. ' 43 The notion of responsibility, and how the per-
son incorporates and grapples with it, is often a central feature of the
postloss experience. Clinicians have reported and written on one
common experience that relates to this subject of responsibility: the
"counterfactual" thoughts and ruminations of the person's mind.
These are "what if" questions-what if I had not left that day, what if
I had read the warning, what if John had come on time-and they can
be deeply distressing and difficult to dislodge. 44 One commentator
noted:
How one attempts to cope with such thoughts is a topic that has
received virtually no attention in the literature. Do people attempt
to convince themselves that the counterfactual possibilities are im-
plausible, based on alternative actions that were unlikely or unfore-
seeable? ... [T]he very ease with which one could have prevented
the situation that one now faces is likely to haunt one for years.45
Relatedly, even those who understand intellectually that their ac-
tions could not possibly have prevented what happened can experi-
ence the sense of responsibility often termed survivor's guilt: the guilt
and shame that accompanies a sense of feeling that it is wrong and
unfair that one should be unharmed while another died.46
III. THE ROLE OF THE LAWYER
To consider the link between the lawyer's representation and the
client's suffering would be unnecessary if, descriptively speaking, the
lawyer's representation had no influence on the client's suffering.
But, even lacking much empirical data, a no-influence hypothesis
seems untenable. The claiming process itself usually overlaps to some
extent, chronologically, with the suffering-rehabilitation-recovery pro-
cess. In addition, the claiming process will involve cognitive, emo-
tional, decisional, and interpersonal tasks that seem impossible to seal
off from many of the core components of, and influences on, the per-
son's suffering and recovery. These include recollecting and rumi-
43. KLEINMAN, supra note 34, at 29.
44. Christopher G. Davis, The Tormented and the Transformed: Understanding Responses to
Loss and Trauma, in MEANING RECONSTRUCrION & THE EXPERIENCE OF Loss, supra note 23, at
137, 140-42.
45. Id. at 142.
46. See HARVEY, supra note 12, at 59-60.
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nating about the loss, the process of making meaning from the loss,
attribution of responsibility, and handling blame and guilt.
Perhaps, though, the lawyer's representation itself is not a signifi-
cant factor, as distinguished from whatever effects the claiming pro-
cess as a whole has on the loss experience. Yet this, too, seems
untenable. The lawyer is a key player in many of the ways in which
the claiming process could fold into and influence the client's suffering
and recovery process. And this does not just mean that the effect of
the claiming process could be different with a lawyer than without
one. Rather, the lawyer's own style, approach, philosophy, and lan-
guage, among other factors, would seem to have some effects on the
cognitive, decisional, and emotional work that the claim will entail for
the client. Thus, we should consider how and when a lawyer's repre-
sentation can play a positive role, or at least avoid negative impacts to
the degree possible, as to the plaintiff's suffering process.
A brief note about lawyering approaches is appropriate here. A
large and rich literature addresses the question of lawyering styles,
including writings from professional responsibility scholars and
clinical practitioners. Superb books and articles contain both theoreti-
cal and practical materials for training law students and lawyers in
negotiating, counseling, listening, empathizing, fact gathering, and es-
tablishing the nature of the lawyer-client relationship. 47 Obviously,
this Article addresses some lawyering scenarios and issues, but it does
not assume a particular answer to which models or styles of lawyering
are best in general or in given contexts. 48 For instance, suppose that a
lawyer generally follows a client-centered approach to lawyering, us-
ing empathic and active listening. Another lawyer might use a more
directive approach.49 Either way, the choice of method does not an-
swer the particular questions addressed in this Article.
Toward this end, this section of the paper: (a) identifies some main
ways in which the lawyer's role can interact with the plaintiff's loss
process; (b) addresses whether and to what extent a plaintiff's lawyer
has competence to recognize when and how the lawsuit interacts with
47. See ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING, AND
NEGOTIATING (1990); DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CEN-
TERED APPROACH (2d ed. 2004). For a review of several leading texts, see Robert D. Dinerstein,
Book Reviews, 39 UCLA L. REV. 697 (1992) (analyzing two clinical teaching texts).
48. For an excellent analysis of lawyering models, with a focus on the dominant client-cen-
tered model, see Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement,
39 ARIZ. L. REV. 501 (1990).
49. For discussion of directive approaches, see Robert F. Cochran, Jr. et al., Symposium: Cli-
ent Counseling and Moral Responsibility, 30 PEPP. L. REv. 591, 592-93 (2003) (describing three
general models of lawyering); Dinerstein, supra note 48, at 506.
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the client's loss process and, if so, whether the lawyer has competence
to take any action in light of this; and (c) outlines some steps towards
a praxis for a plaintiff's lawyer-some suggestions about practice that
are rooted in the theories of lawyering and theories of suffering, and,
in turn, some thoughts about lawyering theory as informed by the
practice of representing the individual who suffers.50
A. How the Lawyer Plays a Role
1. Discussing the Basic Concepts of Liability: Defendant's Liability,
Plaintiffs Contributory Negligence, and Liability of Other
Parties and Nonparties
The lawyer must explain the legal notion of fault under whatever
standard is applicable (negligence, for example, "stricter" products li-
ability, or fraud) and the factual essence of why this defendant or
these defendants might be liable. At some point, too, the lawyer will
need to discuss the notion of contributory negligence if this is rele-
vant. In some cases, the lawyer also will need to explain why some
actors may or may not be defendants to the claim. A more marginally
faulty actor might be named as defendant; conversely, someone whose
acts clearly warrant blame might not be named as defendant. As the
claim proceeds, the lawyer must explain, to some extent, how these
matters will be proved and the chances of liability findings on the de-
fendants and fault findings on the client. In addition, the lawyer will
need to explain the discovery that is possible or likely from the plain-
tiff or his or her loved ones; this includes what the plaintiff will be
obligated to answer in writing or by deposition, and similarly with
family members and loved ones whose testimony will be relevant to
liability or damages (for instance, a plaintiff's son might have to testify
about what he saw in the accident, or how this has affected his
mother's abilities).
Discussions of fault hit a note that lies at the heart of the client's
suffering and loss process. The notion of responsibility is a key part of
the suffering person's working out an account, or narrative, that
comes to terms with the question of bafflement in a way that is helpful
50. The term here refers not just to practice or even theoretically informed practice, but also
to "the critical relationship between theory and practice whereby each is dialectically influenced
and transformed by the other." DAVID TRACY, BLESSED RAGE FOR ORDER: THE NEW PLURAL-
ISM IN THEOLOGY 243 (1975). Cf. Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and
Political Lawyering Practice in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 821, 874 (1997) (sug-
gesting "an explicit race praxis characterized by reflective action: infusing antiracism practice
with aspects of critical inquiry and pragmatism, and then recasting theory in light of practical
experience") (internal citations omitted).
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to the person. Working out such an account can take years; it involves
sorting and re-sorting questions of cause and responsibility at many
points in time. Thus, over time, the person could go through an early
part of this working-out process, dealing with: rumination, obsessive
reviewing of what happened, and attributions of responsibility tied to
"what ifs" (for example, some victims have asked, "if my sister had
not insisted on picking this resort for the family retreat, then my son
would not have been injured" or "if I had not been in Chicago for the
business trip, I could have picked David up instead of asking him to
find a ride home"). 51 Later periods of working out could include attri-
butions of responsibility that cohere with the client's meaning making.
Thus, the work of understanding and building the case for legal
fault is an overlay onto the client's own processing of cause, responsi-
bility, and bafflement. 52 The possible influences of this overlay could
take many forms and be very potent. Some might be quite positive.
The client's participation in understanding and building the legal fault
case might fold into and further his or her postloss recovery in various
ways: by cohering well with the client's own groping efforts to under-
stand why this happened, by the sense that establishing legal fault will
prevent other losses if not this one ("make the city fix the intersection
where my brother died"), by addressing the person's need for a formal
attribution of responsibility and consequence as to the wrongdoer who
has caused the loss.
51. See David S. Boninger et al., Counterfactual Thinking: From What Might Have Been to
What May Be, 67 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 297 (1994) (explaining research findings that
demonstrate amelioration of self-blame and regret when one's perspective shifts from
"counterfactual" thinking to "what may be"). Cf. ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN 296-307
(1985) (discussing the structure of a products liability trial in which a child was burned, explain-
ing that each repetitive telling of the story at trial raised in the jury's mind the wish that "let her
this time not have been so burned," and stating that the plaintiffs counsel's job is to raise "that
collective passive wish" into a particular decision about the product).
52. Granted, for some losses or for some people, a particular aspect of legal fault will not be
important at a given point in time. One lawyer tells of two parents who contacted him in con-
nection with their forty-year-old son, who died after a possibly misdiagnosed heart attack and
who left two small children. The lawyer agreed to review the case and sent the medical records
to a respected cardiologist for review. The doctor wrote a preliminary report concluding that the
cardiologist on call in the emergency room that night had failed to follow the accepted diagnostic
practice and that, had he done so, the death might have been prevented. When the lawyer told
the parents of the consulting doctor's conclusion, he said this meant the case would go forward,
and that he (the Lwyer) hoped that the parents would not feel fresh grief at the report that their
son's death was medically preventable. The parents then explained to the lawyer that they
viewed the lawsuit as a method for obtaining funds that they would put into trust for their
grandchildren if the law allowed recovery; that they had always believed their son's death was
medically preventable but they had already made their peace with this; and this report-and, for
that matter, the lawsuit-was not a factor in their recovery.
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Yet explaining and building the legal fault case could also intensify
the client's suffering and interfere with the client's recovery. One
problem is timing: the legal claim is focused on one story of responsi-
bility; months and years are devoted to this story. Time goes on, the
legal story is essentially static, but the loss process is not static. An-
other problem is possible dissonance, or at least gaps, between the
cause and responsibility attribution that the client works toward, and
the substance or timing of the legal fault case. The client might be
working towards forgiving himself or herself for not more closely
monitoring how close his or her child was to the participants in the
games at the state fair; yet the lawyer now has to prepare the client for
his or her deposition, where the defense lawyer is expected to ques-
tion him or her closely about this topic and make it a central argument
in settlement or trial presentations. Or the lawyer needs to explain
why the lawsuit will not name as defendant the man who sexually as-
saulted the plaintiff, and instead will name only the property manager
of the downtown garage where the assault took place. Or the lawsuit
will uncover facts (and thus make the client aware of facts) that are
unnecessary and may be harmful to the client's recovery (that her hus-
band did not die instantly; that the daughter who had been hit by a car
on the side of the road while walking some distance from her own car
had parked and left her car because she was meeting someone to buy
drugs).
Another problem is that the work the client must do to build and
participate in the legal fault case might be at odds with where the
client is, emotionally and physically, in the suffering and loss process.
Recollecting the loss event, describing the loss and its consequences,
and "giving sorrow words" 53 can be essential steps for the suffering
person.54 But the timing and adversarial context of the telling, in a
lawsuit and discovery, could make the telling unhelpful, confusing,
and grief- or guilt-intensifying.
53. The phrase comes from the title of a book, Give Sorrow Words. See HARVEY, supra note
12.
54. Indeed, a considerable body of respected literature now supports the therapeutic value of
translating, into spoken or written words, emotional upheavals and loss. See generally EMOTION,
DISCLOSURE, & HEALTH (James W. Pennebaker ed., 1995) (compiling research addressing the
link between disclosure and health).
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2. Introducing the Categories of Damages, Discussing Which Are
Compensable and Noncompensable, and Assessing the
Likely Range of Damage Findings
In discussing damages with the client, the lawyer will first have to
introduce the client to a way of understanding or framing the injury
that the client otherwise often would not employ.5 5 That is, even leav-
ing aside other issues such as whom to sue or the likelihood of liabil-
ity, the lawyer must explain the rules dictating which dimensions of
the client's loss get translated into particular damage items, and the
rules dictating the compensability of those items. In addition to this
general introduction, the lawyer at various points will need to advise
the client about the possible range of damages, as assessed by the trier
of fact, by the defendant and defendant's counsel and insurer in settle-
ment contexts, and by any mediator or neutral.
These discussions seem likely to intersect with several dimensions
of the client's suffering and loss process. Although these intersections
could take multiple forms depending on the client and the loss, some
seem especially likely. Discussion of noneconomic damages will ex-
plain that these particular losses are compensable (disfigurement of
the body through scars, inability to engage in the same activities as
before, diminished quality of the client's intimate relationship with his
or her spouse), and the client's suffering in regard to those losses is
compensable. Then, at some point, the conversation must explain that
the damages for these items will fall within particular a range, and
why.
It seems unlikely that many clients could bracket off these conver-
sations from the process of remembering and recollecting what has
been lost, and from meaning making in connection with the loss. Con-
sider some of the ways the legal conversation connects to the client's
personal loss journey, such as timing. At various points, the client will
have moved to different steps in his or her recollection and under-
standing of the loss. Perhaps the client has settled in his or her mind a
55. Granted, with some aspects of loss, the use of compensatory language would be part of the
client's understanding of the loss anyway. For instance, if a person has a hand injury that dimin-
ishes earning capacity, her own understanding and meaning making with regard to the injury
would include its monetary impact on her life-whether or not a lawsuit occurred or a lawyer
introduced that language into the mix. But, absent the claiming process, a person would not
otherwise need to understand the following, among other items: that the diminished quality of
her marital life (sexual and otherwise) can be compensated; that the diminished quality of her
relationship with her children is not compensated; that her conscious awareness, even horror, of
the impending accident is part of compensable losses; that mental anguish, in addition to physi-
cal pain, is compensable; that her dreams about what she might do in the future and can no
longer do are part of what is compensable.
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picture of what happened, what was lost, what was not lost; the client
now is grappling with what this means and what to do now. The legal
conversation, however, continues to replay the loss-both the loss
event and each step of the painful and difficult work of grasping the
loss and understanding it.56 Perhaps, for some, this replaying is con-
gruent with, or not disruptive to, their journey through this loss. For
others, however, the opposite might be the case.
Another point of intersection is the need to think about nonmone-
tary losses in monetary terms. Again, it seems unlikely that clients
can bracket this off from the process of meaning making. Indeed, the
possibility of monetary recovery-and its range-end up having to be
considered as the client tries to understand the implications of the loss
for his or her life and the nature of the world after the loss. Some
clients will be able to integrate the legal monetizing into their recov-
ery process. For instance, a parent who loses a hand in a defectively
designed metal-shearing machine might find meaning and value in the
notion that his or her physical pain and postaccident depression will
yield money that can help fund a better education for his or her chil-
dren. Or the notion of monetary recovery will coincide with the cli-
ent's sense that justice requires the defendant to make restoration
with money to the extent possible. For others, the legal monetizing
might be more difficult to integrate if, for instance, the clients perceive
themselves as commodifying the loss of something priceless or beyond
the range of monetary discussions.
3. Decisions Relating to the Lawsuit and Decisions About
Settlement
Thus far, the discussion has focused on the lawyer's explaining and
assessing liability and damages. Still to consider are those many times
in which a client must make decisions. These include choices about
the framing of the case (for instance, whether to bring a child's con-
sortium claim), the types of damages asserted, whether and for what
amount to settle, how to handle the subject of apology or memorial
action, whether to settle the case in a lump-sum or in some sort of
payout form. Consider the following examples:
* A married couple consults a lawyer after an accident that caused
the husband to suffer a serious head injury and reduced cognitive
functioning. The lawyer eventually explains that, in this jurisdic-
tion, a minor child can recover damages for consortium for a seri-
56. Cf SCARRY, supra note 51, at 298-99 (describing how the plaintiffs lawyer in a products
liability case tells and retells the story, in part to build in the jury a desire that the story, this
time, have a different ending).
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ous injury to the parent. A child also might have a "bystander"
claim. The parents have two children, ages eight and eleven.
One of the children witnessed the accident. The lawyer explains
that if the children's consortium claim is added, both children will
probably need to give discovery with respect to their relationship
with their father before the accident. Further, the lawyer ex-
plains, the bystander claim would require the child to give addi-
tional discovery such as what he witnessed in the accident or how
he felt.
" In this jurisdiction, an emerging line of cases takes a new slant on
the discoverability of psychiatric or counseling records. Previ-
ously, any assertion of damages for emotional distress allowed
discovery of the psychiatric records of the plaintiff. The newer
line of cases suggests that discovery of these records will not be
triggered solely if the claimant asserts mental anguish in the man-
ner of a general damage-pleads and proves the damages as
those that would follow naturally in the wake of a loss of the sort
the plaintiff suffered. Thus, the lawyer advises the client that she
has a choice about how to present the claim for mental anguish.
One route might yield lower damages, but would probably pre-
vent discovery of therapy records. The other route might lead to
more recovery but open the client's psychiatric records.
" The lawyer is retained to bring a wrongful death and survival case
when the spouse falls from a crumbling sidewalk at a "scenic
overlook" on a mountain drive. The surviving spouse believes
that his wife died instantly when her head hit the rocks below. In
looking into the case, the lawyer obtains the autopsy report
(which the husband has not seen); the report concludes that she
died from internal bleeding caused by rocks that hit or rolled onto
her when she fell.
" A settlement is offered in the form of a structured, annuity-
funded payout, with lump-sum payments at the outset and at vari-
ous intervals. The defendant would also be willing to settle for a
lump sum entirely at the outset, but the "present value" of the
structured settlement is higher than the lump-sum payment.
These examples illustrate two categories of decisions that can affect
the loss: strategic decisions about the lawsuit (which claims to include
and which damages to emphasize) that will directly affect how the
plaintiff and his or her loved ones recreate and re-encounter the loss,
and decisions about whether and how to settle. These decisions could
affect the client's suffering and meaning making in myriad ways. One
way is the need to decide whether to take an action that might bring
more "success" in the lawsuit but that might also expose the client or a
loved one to evidence, questioning, or revelations that could interrupt
the recovery or increase the suffering of the client or loved one.
Second, the client now will have to make decisions about monetiz-
ing the loss and appraising the likelihood of liability. Earlier, the cli-
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ent will have been introduced to the legal language of damages and
liability, but now the client will have to engage in decisions for which
he or she must use the legal framing. If the client previously negoti-
ated this legal language with a useful attitude of detachment from it,
he or she must now employ it to make a decision with significant con-
sequences. And the decision is imbued with meaning about the loss
itself and about responsibility.
Third, the client will be engaged in a decision about how and when
to end the lawsuit, which can be significant. The "results" of liability
and damages are now final, and the client must incorporate these re-
sults into his or her understanding of the loss. In addition, both the
amount of the settlement and its structure will have tangible and often
critical effects on the plaintiff's life.57
B. Competence?
How can or should the lawyer act, given the complex and potent
interplay between these aspects of the lawsuit and the client's suffer-
ing and loss process? Should the lawyer try to counsel the client in a
way that is least intrusive, or most helpful, as to the plaintiff's own loss
recovery process? As practitioners and scholars are aware, current
professional responsibility rules permit the lawyer to counsel the cli-
ent about not only legal factors, but also nonlegal factors that bear on
matters within the scope of representation.58 Yet, even if the lawyer
"may" counsel the client with respect to nonlegal matters under the
professional rules, a foundational question arises: the question of com-
petence. As the Restatement phrases it, a lawyer must "act with rea-
sonable competence" as to "matters within the scope of the
representation."59 This means that "[i]n pursuing a client's objectives,
a lawyer must use reasonable care," and must "be competent to han-
57. See Ellen S. Pryor, After the Judgment, 88 VA. L. REV. 1757 (2002) (explaining the many
ways in which decisions about settlement affect the plaintiffs future).
58. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 2.1 (2002) (addressing lawyer as advisor and
stating that "[iun rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations
such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's situa-
tion"). For a thorough discussion of the history and reach of this provision and its permission
and encouragement of nonlegal counseling, see Larry 0. Natt Gantt, II, More Than Lawyers:
The Legal and Ethical Implications of Counseling Clients on Nonlegal Considerations, 18 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHics 365 (2005). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§ 94(3) (2000) (stating that "[iun counseling a client, a lawyer may address nonlegal aspects of a
proposed course of conduct, including moral, reputational, economic, social, political, and busi-
ness aspects").
59. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 (2000).
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dle the matter, having the appropriate knowledge, skills, time, and
professional qualifications. '60
Thus, even if the lawyer aspires to discuss these issues in a way that
minimizes the client's suffering and loss, is the lawyer competent to
carry this out?61 One could plausibly argue that a personal injury law-
yer should be aware of some of the most basic features of the suffering
and recovery process. These would include: that the process occurs
over a period of time not predictable or bounded by the "typical"
timeframes or the timeframe of the lawsuit; that explanations of what
happened and why it happened are not just legal issues but have in-
tense significance for the client's own suffering and meaning making;
that spiritual understandings or framing of the loss will be very impor-
tant for many clients; that the suffering process is not bracketed off
and linear, but instead is shaped by the client's understandings and
meaning. Probably most importantly, the lawyer should be expected
to understand that the legal claiming process will be an overlay onto a
suffering and meaning making process that cannot be bracketed off
entirely from the legal process.
60. In lawyer malpractice litigation, the duty of competence is translated into a standard of
care. Formulations vary somewhat but follow the approach described in the leading treatise on
legal malpractice: "The ultimate test of competence is reasonable conduct, which is determined
by the standard of care that requires the exercise of skill and knowledge ordinarily possessed by
attorneys under similar circumstances." 2 ROBERT E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMrrH, LEGAL
MALPRAcTICE § 18.3, at 558 (4th ed. 1996). As applied to the situations set out in the text, the
"standard of care" meaning of competence is not very helpful. This is because lawyer practices
in these respects are probably not very developed, and any developed practices are probably not
conveyed by the formal and informal means of learning the profession. Somewhat analogous is
the problem faced some years ago by courts addressing the law of informed consent in medical
malpractice. If the doctor's disclosure was measured by the usual professional liability stan-
dard-the accepted customary practice-the doctor's actions usually would measure up because
disclosure practices had not developed very much. Thus, to whatever degree the doctor dis-
closed risk, the doctor probably was doing as much as the "ordinary, custom" practitioner. Cf.
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 791-92 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (holding that the "custom" ap-
proach is not the preferable standard for informed consent, as distinct from negligent treatment
claims).
61. A recent article addressing counseling on nonlegal considerations addresses the question
of competence. See Gantt, supra note 58, at 388-97. Professor Gantt concludes:
Attorneys therefore should consider whether traditionally "nonlegal" issues have be-
come so intertwined with the legal ones in their field that they should acquire knowl-
edge of those issues or at least associate with an expert to whom they can refer clients.
Furthermore, attorneys should be mindful that clients may incorrectly assume that cer-
tain nonlegal advice they provide is part of the representation and clients may rely on
that advice to their detriment. Attorneys thus should provide some disclaimers if they
sense the consultation moving to nonlegal matters. Although a full disclosure pursuant
to Rule 5.7 may be impracticable and may frustrate the benefit of the nonlegal counsel-




Given the premise that a lawyer should have some basic knowledge
of the loss process, the lawyer does not have therapeutic competence
to understand how all or most of the language and actions relating to
the case will affect-positively or negatively-the client's suffering
and loss. This would require therapeutic competence well beyond
what could be expected of lawyers, even if we could assume best prac-
tices with respect to lawyer education. The interactions and effects
are too individual, psychological, and nuanced; psychological compe-
tence seems required.
This is not to say, however, that we can expect nothing more of the
lawyer than a correctly articulated statement of the rules of liability
and how they play out given the evidence in a case. First, at various
points along the way, the lawyer could offer explanatory or prepara-
tory discussion aimed at allowing the client to distinguish between the
legal framing of a case and the client's own experience of loss. Here,
the goal would not be to force or even encourage the client to detach
from the language and meaning of the lawsuit. Rather, the goal would
be to permit the client to uncouple, or to integrate, the legal frame-
work and his or her own understanding in whatever ways might be
most helpful for the client.
Second, although the lawyer does not have general therapeutic
competence about the interplay between the legal fault case and the
client's own account-making as to responsibility, a lawyer at times will
recognize that some aspect of the case is intersecting with the client's
loss process in a way that could warrant discussion with, or counsel by,
the lawyer, perhaps followed by a decision relating to the matter in
question. This can happen in myriad ways. Consider these examples:
" The lawyer notices, from the client's language or actions, that the
client's anxiety, grief, or other mental distress has heightened sig-
nificantly because of some development, issue, or upcoming mat-
ter in the case. For instance, the client's deposition is coming up,
or the client is markedly more anxious and depressed when the
lawyer notifies the client that the expert who has reviewed the
possible medical malpractice claim has concluded that the treat-
ing doctor did not follow the standard of care and that this caused
the client's injury.
" A fifty-eight-year-old woman, living alone in an apartment, wakes
up one night and hears an intruder. She hesitates for a moment,
paralyzed with fear, and then picks up the phone to call 911. The
intruder comes into her bedroom, grabs a heavy statue on the
woman's dresser, and smashes it into her face. She remembers
nothing else. When she regains consciousness, she is in a hospital
room. She has undergone surgery, though she does not suffer
from any cognitive impairment. She does, however, have a skull
that is somewhat "caved in" near the forehead, and this is very
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noticeable. At the urging of her family, the woman sees a lawyer.
Investigation reveals that the apartment complex had ignored nu-
merous complaints from tenants about two men who were staying
in the laundry room of the complex, and who, residents believed,
were breaking and entering apartments. In addition, the woman
had a broken latch on her window, and she had notified the apart-
ment manager of this, but then had not followed up to make sure
that the latch was fixed. Eventually, the two men are arrested
and convicted of various burglary crimes. The police believe that
one of the men probably was the one who injured the woman, but
they lack evidence sufficient to bring charges against him.
While preparing the lawsuit against the apartment complex and
its management company, the lawyer often hears his client ex-
press ambivalence and doubt, some of which relate to the lawsuit
and most of which seem to come from her religious beliefs. She
tells the lawyer, for instance, that she tries hard to forgive the
man who did this but is having trouble doing so; she wonders if it
is right to sue the property manager when the criminal seems at
least as responsible; she tries to stay upbeat but she feels shame
from her disfigurement and sometimes wonders why she feels
God is more distant in her mind; she has consulted her pastor, but
she still wonders if perhaps the lawsuit is creating her distance
from God because perhaps it shows she is unwilling to forgive.
After coming to know the client over a course of months, the law-
yer has a sense that some upcoming feature of the case-such as
an expert report-will be very disturbing for the client. (The dif-
ference between this and the first example is that, here, the client
is not displaying agitated behaviors; rather, the lawyer just has a
sense, given what he knows of the client, that an upcoming event
will be dislocating.)
In these and other such situations, the lawyer might have some
ideas or instincts about possible options, or about how to interact with
the client. For instance, the lawyer in the first situation might think
(a) he or she should suggest that the client discuss the expert report
with her therapist; (b) it might be helpful if the lawyer asked the client
about what is distressing him or her about the expert report or the
upcoming deposition, and then discuss these concerns with the client;
or (c) it might be wise to postpone the deposition until the client
seems to be in a more stable posture. In the second situation, the
lawyer might be inclined to engage the client in a discussion of the
nonlegal theme, such as by discussing with the client his or her fears
that seeking blame in a lawsuit conflicts with the client's reading of
the Bible. In the third situation, the lawyer might decide to engage
the client in a preparatory discussion about what the lawyer senses is
going to be a dislocating moment in the claim.
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The list of situations, and what the lawyer might consider doing,
could go on and on. These situations pose two questions. One is
whether the lawyer-even if sincere and meaning well-is competent
to recognize that the lawsuit is interacting with the recovery process at
this point. Second, even if the lawyer is competent to recognize the
situation, what may the lawyer permissibly do within the range of his
or her competence and within the scope of the representation?
As to the first question, the answer seems to be yes, at least some of
the time. Recognizing a dissonance or tension between some aspect
of the suit and the client's emotional situation does not necessarily
take therapeutic competence. The lawyer is not a therapist or a
mental health professional and surely should not try to act as one.
But, in the course of months and sometimes years working with a cli-
ent, the lawyer may know the client well enough to sense that the
client is having a problem with something that is connected to the
lawsuit but not directly part of "the case." The lawyer is not qualified
to diagnose someone with generalized anxiety disorder, posttraumatic
stress syndrome, or depression. But he or she can be qualified to con-
clude that, at this point in time, the client is having a particular per-
sonal, emotional, or religious concern or anxiety as a result of the
lawsuit.
If the lawyer can be competent in perceiving these situations, what
is the range of permissible actions? Lacking therapeutic competence,
the lawyer should not have, as his or her aim, to help the client work
out the mental, emotional, or spiritual problem. For instance, the law-
yer should not try to engage the client in a discussion focused on
resolving the client's anger towards God or his or her guilt over the
accident. Yet the scope of the lawyer's representation does include
helping the client understand the nonlegal considerations that bear on
the client's objectives in the lawsuit. And, it seems, the lawyer can
have competence in this respect. Specifically, the lawyer can be com-
petent to explore these nonlegal matters to the extent necessary to
understand the client's objectives in the lawsuit, or to the extent nec-
essary to explain to the client how the lawsuit does or does not affect
the emotional, mental, or religious concern as the client has expressed
that concern and as the lawyer understands it. More detail about how
to carry this out appears in the next section.
C. Praxis
Having developed a richer sense of how and why the lawyer's role
can interact with the client's loss, and having addressed the bounda-
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ries of the lawyer's competence, we can now posit some features of a
practice informed by, and open to, the client's suffering and loss.
1. Understanding That One's Professional Role Will Create a
Relationship With, and a Relationship That Can Affect, a
Suffering Person Who Is in a Process of Loss and
Recovery, and Understanding the Boundaries of
That Relationship
A personal injury lawyer is often the first professional "helper" a
client sees; sometimes the lawyer is the only such helper; sometimes
the lawyer is one of several (i.e., therapist, pastoral counselor, rehabil-
itation specialist). Whether the only professional helper or one of sev-
eral, the lawyer is in a relationship that cannot bracket off the reality
of, or the relationship's possible effects on, the loss experience of the
client. When one understands this, the question then becomes how I,
as this person's lawyer, can and should represent my client in a way
that remains within the boundaries of my role and yet-to the extent
possible-does not increase and possibly diminishes his suffering and
loss.
It would be helpful to keep in mind some general guidelines about
"nonprofessional" counselors-people without therapeutic training
Who nonetheless function as counselors in some respect. Therapists
Eugene Kennedy and Sara C. Charles have suggested a basic guide-
line: nonprofessional counselors should be "supportive rather than un-
covering in their psychological interventions. '62 Supportive assistance
focuses on the "current conscious life situation of the persons seeking
help. ' 63 It does not seek to be uncovering-the nonprofessional
counselor should "deliberately and carefully avoid any psychological
archeological expeditions to excavate levels beneath [the client's] eve-
ryday awareness of problems." 64 This means avoiding techniques such
as free association, dream analysis, or "remaining achingly neutral,"
techniques that "may rupture the defenses that the person has erected
against dealing with the unconscious conflicts" with which the person
struggles. 65 On the other hand, useful techniques include the counsel-
ing skills emphasized in clinical and lawyering classes: allowing the
client to ventilate; remaining conscious of the client's story and avoid-
62. EUGENE KENNEDY & SARA C. CHARLES, ON BECOMING A COUNSELOR: A BASIC GUIDE
FOR NONPROFESSIONAL COUNSELORS AND OTHER HELPERS 6 (3d ed. 2001).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 7 (emphasis omitted).
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ing imposing the lawyer's story on the client;66 exploring the concern
by asking for description and prompting of details that the person can
easily remember; clarification of the concern; suggestion; reassurance;
education; and empathy. 67
2. Communicating Some Basics: Timeline, Information,
Decisionmaking, Objectives
Near the outset of the representation, personal injury practitioners
take various steps worth noting; these steps relate to timeline, desire
for information, decisionmaking, and objectives. As to timeline, the
lawsuit follows one timeline; the person's suffering and loss follow an-
other. Because the lawsuit can be a source of confusion, stress, mis-
placed expectations, and pain, clarification about the legal timeline is
both professionally necessary and can be enormously helpful in reduc-
ing confusion, stress, and misplaced expectations. This is especially so
when the lawyer conveys the sense that, during many time blocks, the
client really does not need to do much with respect to the lawsuit and
yet what seems like "down time" in the lawsuit will be time when the
lawyer is working. One lawyer, in a lovely phrase, tells his client to
"let me carry that burden"-the burden of working up the lawsuit,
getting information, knowing what to do and when. The lawyer
continues:
For the next six months, it looks as though we will be finishing
consulting with some experts and filing the case. Probably there
won't be any discovery requests-things you have to provide the
other side-for six months. Most of the work we will be doing will
relate to research and investigation. Feel free to call us at any time,
but you don't need to feel that you will have to be really occupied
with the case for the next six months. Let us carry that burden for
you; we will be working all these things.68
66. A substantial literature explores the danger of lawyering styles that replaces the client's
own narratives with the lawyer's legal voice or legal categories. As Professor Anthony Alfieri
has put it (in the context of poverty lawyers): "Lawyer storytelling falsifies client story when
lawyer narratives silence and displace client narratives." Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructing
Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107, 2111 (1991).
For other discussion of this general concern, see Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives:
Recognizing Client Narrative in Case Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV. 485 (1994); Lucie E. White,
Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38
BuFF. L. REV. 1 (1990).
67. See generally BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 47; BINDER ET AL., supra note 47.
68. This quote and the following quotes are drawn from plaintiff's personal injury lawyers
with whom I discussed this Article. Because these quotes reflect the lawyers' personal choices
and styles of communication, my preference is not to identify the lawyers. These lawyers do not
reflect a wide or random sample of personal injury lawyers. Rather, they come from several
lawyers-each with different styles and approaches-who represent some of the finest and most
dedicated professionals I know.
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Lawyers also see that personal injury clients can differ greatly in
their desire for information and detail about the case. Mindful of this,
they address the client's level of interest in keeping informed of each
development-options include being copied on all correspondence, or
just receiving updates.
As to decisionmaking and objectives, lawyers early on can use lan-
guage that validates the client's interest in pursuing a claim, expresses
the lawyer's commitment to and empathy for the client, and lets the
client know that the lawyer understands and recognizes the difference
between the legal claim and the client's loss. According to one law-
yer, her introductory comments include:
I know that this lawsuit cannot bring back what you have lost, and
I know that I cannot feel what you are feeling. But it is an honor
and a privilege to represent you, and I will treat this case as if it
were a loss that I had suffered.
According to another lawyer:
My job is to provide you with the best educated decisions I can
give you about the liability and damages in this case from a legal
perspective, and give you my best legal recommendations. But I
know that, for you, it is not a legal decision; you have many factors
to consider besides just the ones that are my expertise.
3. Preparatory and Introductory Language That Permits the Client
to Find His or Her Own Degree of Overlap or Nonoverlap
Between Legal Language, Standards, Proof, and the
Client's Understanding of and Meaning About the
Loss
As discussed earlier, the lawyer cannot know whether and to what
extent various aspects of the case will integrate into the client's recov-
ery, will interrupt the process or intensify suffering, or will have no
particular effect. Yet the lawyer can offer preparatory and explana-
tory language that makes clear to the client that he or she need not
force his or her meanings of loss or responsibility into the legal frame-
work. The goal should not be to encourage a distancing between the
client's understanding and the legal framing; the lawyer cannot under-
stand and should not prejudge the connections or disconnections that
might exist for the client. But, by explaining that the legal language
and standards have their own rationales and limitations, the lawyer
can permit the client to detach the legal standard from the client's
meaning, without conveying a lack of integrity about the claim pro-
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cess. 69 For example, a lawyer might provide something like the fol-
lowing explanation the first time the lawyer introduces the categories
of compensable damages:
Now and at other times in this process, you will hear about cer-
tain categories of damages. By the word "damages," we mean the
types of losses-both financial and emotional-that can be compen-
sated in a lawsuit of this sort. You will hear a lot more about these
categories of damages as time goes on, but I wanted to make a few
overall points at the start. First, these are legal terms, which the law
has developed over time for many reasons. The law of torts tries to
capture, in these words, a lot of the dimensions of injury and grief,
but you should not feel as though you have to use these words your-
self in your own understanding and experience of the loss. Second,
a lawsuit seeks compensation for all these damages at one point in
time-for instance, at the time we settle or go to trial. But of course
you will experience some of these losses at earlier and later points
in time. For instance, maybe your physical pain has lessened, but
your emotional turmoil is greater. You should not feel that you are
supposed to be experiencing all these losses at the same point in
time, or that it is somehow bad for your lawsuit if some parts of
your loss seem to have improved. In the lawsuit, we can present the
past, present, and future of your damages. Third, you will learn that
some losses-maybe even some of the losses that you consider im-
portant-are not compensated by tort law as damages. And you
will hear that some damages-the ones that the law calls
noneconomic-are not compensated above a certain ceiling, which
in this jurisdiction is [$500,000]. Later, I will explain what this
means for your lawsuit. For now, though, you should understand
that these are decisions that the law has made; they do not mean
that these losses are less real, less painful than other losses. 70
4. Preparatory Language About Noticing and Conveying Nonlegal
Concerns
As explained earlier, the lawyer lacks general therapeutic compe-
tence, but can notice and respond to the points of tension or distress
between the claim and the client's suffering and loss. (More detail
about the lawyer's response will appear below.) A client, however,
might think that he or she should not mention questions or concerns
that are not directly "about" the lawsuit. The lawyer can explain early
on that the client can ask questions or express concerns about timing,
69. Depending on the case, timing, and client, the lawyer might even want to discuss with the
client the notion that a legal finding of fault, or a settlement or judgment, reflects only the
imperfect justice that the legal system can provide.
70. This language, unlike the quotes in the text accompanying notes 68-69 supra, is not taken
from conversations with plaintiffs' lawyers. Rather, the passage is my effort to illustrate the kind
of explanatory language that might be helpful in this context.
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participation by the client, distress, or the level of information that the
client might want if more detail about the accident becomes available.
5. Major Themes Including Justice, God, Guilt, and Monetizing
Loss
Many dimensions of the lawsuit will intersect with central themes in
a client's loss process. Many examples have already been illustrated,
these include seeking justice, guilt, anger at or confusion about God or
the tenets of the person's religion, and confusion and ambivalence
about monetizing the loss. In keeping with the general guidelines al-
ready noted, the lawyer should not try to assess the client or try to
elicit these themes from the client. Yet clients may nonetheless ex-
press them. As argued earlier, the scope of the representation, and
the lawyer's competence, may allow the lawyer to discuss these con-
cerns with the client as they interact with the lawsuit. Yet in what
ways, and to what extent, can a lawyer engage the client in these mat-
ters without stepping past the boundaries of the lawyer's competence?
First, some themes about the lawsuit can be both descriptively accu-
rate and often helpful to a client who is working through a concern or
distress over the lawsuit and an emotional or spiritual issue. One ex-
ample of such a theme is that the legal claim at most reflects one of
this society's tools, and an imperfect tool at that, for attributing re-
sponsibility and giving compensation. The theme can validate the
value that the client finds in the legal claim, and yet give the client
permission to uncouple his or her own meanings from a particular le-
gal term or decision. Another theme is the purpose of, and limitations
of, monetizing the intensely personal. Again, this can validate the
meanings or value that the client finds in the claim, and yet allows the
client to uncouple the legal construct from his or her own meanings.
Second, although these will be very contextual encounters, the law-
yer should engage the client in these serious nonlegal issues in a way
that is supportive, not uncovering. To illustrate, return to the case of
the fifty-eight-year-old woman with a disfiguring injury, who is uncer-
tain whether it is right to sue the property owner, and who wonders
whether the lawsuit is related to why she feels that God is so distant.
These are expressed questions and concerns, and they relate to the
lawsuit. The lawyer should not aim to uncover or work with her on
the origins or unconscious levels of these worries. But the lawyer can
acknowledge the concerns that she expresses, understand what the
concern is, and then explain and give information about the suit in
light of these concerns. He or she might say:
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I know that you feel uncertain about the fact that, right now, the
lawsuit does not include a claim against the man who did this.
Maybe it would help to explain the legal reasons behind this; you
can then tell me what you think and we can alter the lawsuit if that
is what you wish to do. The law of this state allows us the choice of
whom to sue. There is no rule that we must sue everyone who is
responsible. If we sue one defendant, and if that defendant feels
that someone else's actions were part of the problem, then our de-
fendant can always sue that person in a separate action for what we
call "'contribution'"-partial payment back of what the defendant
had to pay. Also, in this suit even as it stands now, the property
manager can tell the jury everything about the events of that
night-indeed, we will tell the jury about the criminal who broke in.
So, to decide not to sue the criminal is not keeping a secret from the
jury. Why, then, are we not suing the criminal? The reason is that
we are suing a defendant if two things are true about the defendant:
we think they are legally responsible, and there is some ability to
collect compensation. The criminal is in prison and cannot pay any-
thing. We think the criminal was responsible, but we also think the
property owner was responsible because he knew about this prob-
lem before and did not correct it. So our lawsuit sues the property
owner.
7 1
On the issues of guilt or the client's sense of distance from God, the
lawyer should not move in an "uncovering" way-for instance, asking
the client to go back in memory and think of any other events that left
her with this same feeling, and then probing for connections and dif-
ferences. Rather, the lawyer can acknowledge, clarify, focus, and ex-
plain and give information that addresses the concerns as the client
has expressed them. Because the focus is on the issue as the client
expresses it, the nature and detail of the discussion might change as
the lawyer comes to know the client better or the client feels more
comfortable in expressing these themes. The lawyer's advice might
sound like this:
You have mentioned a number of times lately that God seems
really distant, and that you wonder if this lawsuit is causing this. I
cannot explain why God seems distant to you, but I would like to
mention a few things that you might think about. One is that bring-
ing a lawsuit, legally, does not mean that you have, in your heart,
not forgiven the person. Our tort law allows someone to sue an-
other person for compensation when that person has been the cause
of an injury and when the act was negligent. One main reason for
this law is recognizing that people who are hurt need and deserve
compensation-they have medical bills, lost wages, mental anguish,
and other things. So, even if the injured person forgives the one
who injured them, the law allows the injured person to bring a claim
71. See supra note 70.
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for compensation. So, if you are worried that the lawsuit symbolizes
a lack of forgiveness, I would suggest that, legally, it does not signify
this. I also want to mention something about punishment. You
might think that the lawsuit is seeking a kind of punishment, and
that this is inconsistent with trying to forgive someone. Legally,
though, this case is not about punishment; it is not seeking punish-
ment damages. Actually, the law of torts does allow someone to
seek a type of damage that is specifically directed to punishment.
These are called "punitive damages," and they are specifically given
to punish and deter the person. But, in this suit, we are seeking only
compensatory damages-the amount of money that will compen-
sate you for the losses you have suffered. 72
6. Remaining Within the Scope of Representation
Having said the lawyer can engage in preparatory discussions, and
notice and be responsive to possible nonlegal concerns, one boundary
deserves attention: the lawyer should refrain from counseling that is
outside the scope of the representation. For instance, suppose that a
client continues to express concern about the lawsuit in a way that
makes clear that he or she is conflicted about the connection between
the lawsuit and what the client sees as his or her religious obligation to
forgive. Perhaps the lawyer engages in a conversation airing this con-
cern with the client. Here, the lawyer's act is within the scope of the
representation. The client's own comments and questions have made
clear that, in the client's mind, his or her ability to engage in and un-
derstand the legal claim is connected to the negotiation of the legal
language within his or her faith framework. By contrast, suppose a
client whose spouse has died asks for the lawyer's opinion about
whether selling his or her house and moving to a new location would
help him or her "move on" from the loss. Were the lawyer to answer
this question, the lawyer's action would fall outside scope of the repre-
sentation. The client's question is connected to the loss for which the
lawyer is representing him or her, but the client's question is not about
anything relating to her understanding of, or to the value or status of,
the client's legal claim.
Notice that this point does not necessarily flow from a decision
about the lawyer's competence. Perhaps a particular lawyer would be
competent to engage in counseling about the best forms of investment
for a client, as the lawyer happens to have a degree as a certified fi-
nancial advisor. But the client has retained this lawyer for representa-
tion in a divorce, not for financial advice. Thus, notwithstanding this
72. See supra note 70.
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lawyer's competence to provide this sort of counsel, it lies outside the
scope of the representation.
7. Be Mindful That Recollecting and Ruminating Over the Loss
Have Significance in the Client's Recovery Process
By its nature, the lawsuit will call on the client to tell the story of
the loss event again and again. A growing literature has looked into
the relationship between a person's recollections and expressions
about the loss event and the level of suffering and grief the person
continues to experience. 73 For instance, a number of studies show that
writing about traumatic experiences produces improvement along cer-
tain outcome measures. 74 Other studies have examined "social shar-
ing" rather than private rumination or writing. Some of these studies
suggest that disclosure and sharing are linked to positive health out-
comes; other literature suggests that communicating a major negative
experience can "reactivate the emotional disruption" rather than im-
prove it.75 Still another study found no significant relationship be-
tween social sharing soon after the event and emotional recovery as
measured by several outcomes. 76 This same study, however, found
that poorer recoveries from an emotional episode result when the "re-
hearsals about an emotional experience extend over a long period of
time. '77 For our purposes, the research does not yield clear guidelines
for the lawyer. In part, this is because the literature is itself inconclu-
sive. In addition, the settings of the research are very different from
the lawsuit context. That is, one cannot say that, in general, retelling
the story in litigation contexts is unhelpful or whether it furthers a
meaning-making process.
One can conclude, however, that recollecting, remembering, rumi-
nating over, and re-articulating the loss experience can affect the cli-
ent's level of suffering and his or her recovery. The lawyer can be
73. See James W. Pennebaker & Sandra Klihr Beall, Confronting a Traumatic Event: Toward
an Understanding of Inhibition and Disease, 95 J. ABNORMAL PSYCH-OL. 274, 274-75 (1986) (dis-
cussing evidence relating to how the disclosure of traumatic events can be related to the disease
process).
74. See James W. Pennebaker, Emotion, Disclosure & Health: An Overview, in EMOTION, Dis-
CLOSURE, & HEALTH, supra note 54, at 3, 4 (citing studies).
75. See Bernard Rim6, Mental Rumination, Social Sharing, and the Recovery from Emotional
Exposure, in EMOTION, DISCLOSURE, & HEALTH, supra note 54, at 271, 280 (summarizing stud-
ies on the subject).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 282-83. See also Richard Mayou et al., Prediction of Psychological Outcomes One
Year After a Motor Vehicle Accident, 158 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1231 (2001) (showing that rumina-
tions about an accident and negative interpretations of intrusive recollections were associated
with more negative post traumatic recoveries one year after the accident).
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alert to the times when preparatory and explanatory language along
the way could reduce distress and confusion. For instance, the lawyer
can explain that in the weeks and months to come, the client will be
asked to tell parts or all of the loss event and its aftermath; that these
requests are for information relating to the lawsuit; and that the client
should let the lawyer know if the time or manner of the retelling is
especially bothersome.
At times, the lawyer might have reason to think a particular tell-
ing-such as a client's deposition-will be extremely traumatic. One
lawyer tells of a case in which the parents retained him to represent
their fourteen-year-old child in a claim against a grocery store in
whose parking lot the girl had been sexually assaulted. The lawyer
told the parents he would represent the girl, but he wanted the parents
to know, at the outset, the lawyer would not allow the girl's deposition
to be taken unless her emotional state improved and a therapist
agreed that the deposition would not cause further trauma. And, of
course, lawyers can try to work with opposing counsel about the con-
ditions or timing of a deposition.
8. Do Not Advise the Client to Keep a Pain or Grief Diary; Advise
of the Legal Consequences of Certain Actions but Do Not
Advise for or Against the Actions
A standard personal injury practitioner's guide once noted that the
plaintiff's lawyer should suggest that the client keep a pain diary. For
some individuals, keeping a pain diary or a journal would be helpful to
their processing of the loss. Indeed, some research has supported the
therapeutic value of writing about traumatic loss. But, even if writing
can sometimes be helpful for a person, the lawyer should not advise it
as something to do in connection with the lawsuit. The lawyer simply
cannot know whether this would be beneficial for the client or if in-
stead it will shape or interrupt what otherwise would be the trajectory
of the client's loss process.
The client's life will be changing, especially when the representation
takes place over a period of time. The client might consider moving,
dating someone new (after a spouse has died), home-schooling his or
her children, allowing his or her parents to raise the children for
awhile, and so on. Many actions will have no effect on the claim;
other actions, such as dating or remarrying, might be evidence that the
defendant could use to diminish damages. When the lawyer is aware
of the proposed action, the lawyer should give advice about the legal
consequences, if any. But the lawyer should not advise the client




Although the lawyer is not doctor or therapist, his or her represen-
tation will intersect with and sometimes influence the client's suffering
and loss process. The lawyer is a key player in many of the ways in
which the claiming process could fold into and influence the client's
suffering and recovery process. And the lawyer's own style, approach,
philosophy, and language, among other factors, would seem to have
some effects on the cognitive, decisional, and emotional work that the
claim will entail for the client. This seems plausible even if we make
minimal assumptions about how involved or empathic that lawyer is,
and no matter what style of lawyering is employed.
To explore the implications of this point, an initial step was to un-
derstand some salient themes about suffering and its amelioration.
Thus, Part II turned to the grief and recovery literature that focuses
on how the person-as diminished by the loss during or after any re-
habilitation that is possible-endures, and makes recovery steps in re-
sponse to the sorrow, grief, and dislocation created by the loss. For
instance, a key insight of this literature is that the notion of responsi-
bility is a key part of how a person works out an account, or narrative,
that comes to terms with the question of bafflement.
Part III then turned to the role of the lawyer. It first inquired about
the main ways in which the lawyer's role can interact with the plain-
tiff's loss process. These include the lawyer's explanation, develop-
ment, strategy, and counsel about the fault component of the case-
including the defendant's fault, the plaintiff's possible contributory
fault, and the fault of other actors who might or might not be added to
the case. Building the case for legal fault is an overlay onto the cli-
ent's own processing of cause, responsibility, and bafflement. The pos-
sible influences of this overlay could take many forms, some positive
and some negative. Another point of intersection is the need to think
about nonmonetary losses in monetary terms. In these and other ar-
eas, how a lawyer uses language, gives advice, and suggests strategies,
can intersect with and possibly influence the client's loss process.
The next question, then, is whether and how the lawyer can re-
present the client in a way that is least intrusive, or most helpful, as to
the plaintiff's own loss recovery process. We know that, under profes-
sional responsibility rules, the lawyer may counsel the client with re-
spect to nonlegal matters. But this does not get us far, because a
foundational question arises: the question of competence. That is,
even if the lawyer aspires to represent the client in a way that mini-
mizes suffering, is the lawyer competent to carry out this desire?
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In one sense, the answer is no. The lawyer does not have therapeu-
tic competence to understand how all or most of the language and
actions relating to the case will affect the client-positively or nega-
tively. The interactions and effects are too individual, psychological,
and nuanced; psychological competence seems required. This is not to
say, however, that we can expect nothing more of the lawyer than to
correctly articulate and advise about liability and damages. There are
ways in which the lawyer, while remaining within the scope of his or
her competence, can be mindful of and helpful towards the client's
loss process.
The final section of the Article, then, outlines some thoughts and
suggestions towards this end. These include: remembering that the
representation can overlap onto the client's own meaning-making pro-
cess, respecting the difference between supportive counseling and
counseling that steps into the therapeutic method, providing sugges-
tions about preparatory and explanatory language that allow the client
to uncouple the legal terms and standards from his or her own under-
standings of loss and fault, and engaging with the client over concerns
that he or she presents relating to the connection between the lawsuit
and his or her own perceptions of fault or loss.
In these and other ways detailed in the Article, the personal injury
lawyer's role allows what medical anthropologist Arthur Kleinman
has called "empathic witnessing"-the "existential commitment to be
with the sick person and to facilitate his or her building of an illness
narrative that will make sense of and give value to the experience." 78
Kleinman is referring to physicians, but the phrase can apply to law-
yers notwithstanding the obvious differences in the physician's and the
lawyer's roles. Lawyers, too, can be empathic witnesses: they can and
often do maintain a commitment to be with the injured person, and to
facilitate the client's building of a loss narrative that will make sense
of and give value to the injury.
78. KLEINMAN, supra note 34, at 54.
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